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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Hager contends the district court erred when it overruled his objection to the
introduction of improper propensity evidence during his trial.  The district court did not apply the
proper analysis in ruling on Mr. Hager’s objection, instead letting that evidence in because it did
not discuss an “act of violence,” it only went to the purpose for the argument in question, and it
“set  the  scene”  for  the  argument  in  question.   Those  rationales  are  inconsistent  with  the  plain
language of the relevant rule of evidence or constitute improper res gestae analysis.  Applying
the proper standard, Mr. Hager’s objection should have been sustained because the evidence in
question was not relevant to a non-propensity purpose in this case and the risk of undue prejudice
substantially outweighed whatever minimal probative value that evidence may have had.
As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Hager’s judgment of conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hager and his girlfriend, J.A., had been out drinking at a club.  (Tr., p.291,
L.22 - p.292, L.5, p.360, Ls.16-21.)  J.A. testified that the mood of the evening soured, and they
began arguing.  (Tr., p.294, Ls.22-24; but see Tr., p.361, Ls.16-18 (Mr. Hager testifying they did
not argue at the bar).)  Mr. Hager eventually decided to walk home.  (Tr., p.294, L.12, p.363,
Ls.4-14.)
A few hours later, around midnight, J.A. and Mr. Hager reinitiated their argument via text
message.   (See generally Exhibits, pp.11-23.)  Toward the end of that hour-long argument,
J.A.  indicated  that  she  was  going  to  come  home,  get  some  clothes,  get  in  her  semi-truck,  and
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leave.1  (Exhibits, p.23.)  J.A. then drove her station wagon home from the club.  (Tr., p.339,
Ls.15-17.)  Mr. Hager met her when she got home, and J.A. got into her truck and started the
ignition.  (Tr., p.306, Ls.8-20)  J.A. admitted that, by that point in the night, she was intoxicated.2
(Tr., p.345, Ls.6-22.)
J.A.  testified  that,  after  starting  her  truck,  she  went  into  the  house  to  get  some  clothes
before getting back into the truck and that Mr. Hager followed her, and had pushed her into the
side of the truck, as she did so.  (Tr., p.306, L.20 - p.309, L.6.)  Mr. Hager did not recall any of
that.  (Tr., p.380, L.4 - p.381, L.13.)  Either way, Mr. Hager testified that he wanted to stop
J.A. from driving off in the semi-truck while she was intoxicated, and so, when she was
ultimately in the truck preparing to drive away, he stepped up to the driver’s door and reached
inside the cab to try and take the keys.  (Tr., p.367, Ls.1-22.)  A physical fight ensued, with
Mr. Hager and J.A. each testifying the other was the aggressor.  (Tr., p.310, L.23 - p.312, L.22,
p.369, Ls.9-23.)  However, J.A. admitted she did not remember many of the details from that
point on.  (Tr., p.312, L.23.)
They both agreed that, at some point during the fight, J.A. managed to land a kick which
gave her the chance to close and lock the driver’s door.  (Tr., p.313, Ls.10-17, p.371, Ls.2-24.)
Mr. Hager began moving around the truck, and he testified he was looking for a way in to shut
the truck off.  (Tr., p.314, Ls.17-20, p.372, Ls.20-23)  J.A. testified he was just aggressively
banging on the windows.  (Tr., p.314, L.15 - p.315, L.2.)  Nevertheless, after a short time, she
reopened the driver’s door.  (Tr., p.315, L.2 (J.A. explaining she felt Mr. Hager had calmed
1 J.A.’s semi-truck was just the cab of the truck; it did not have a trailer attached to it.  (See, e.g.,
Tr., p.145, Ls.10-12.)
2 J.A. testified that the legal limit for being under the influence while driving a semi-truck on a
commercial driver’s license is lower than the legal limit for driving a car on a normal driver’s
license.  (Tr., p.336, Ls.15-23.)
3
down during that short interlude).)  Mr. Hager testified he went for the keys again, and this time,
he was successful in shutting the truck off.  (Tr., p.373, L.19.)  J.A. testified that Mr. Hager
simply continued to attack her, this time, choking her.  (Tr., p.315, Ls.8-13.)
A neighbor who had been watching the incident from her window across the street called
the non-emergency police dispatch number.  (Tr., p.124, Ls.19-24, p.126, Ls.11-13.)  She
testified that she could only see the silhouettes of people moving inside the cab of the truck.
(Tr., p.128, Ls.18-20.)  She also testified she heard some of the verbal argument taking place, but
did not decide to call the police until she heard a slap.3  (Tr., p.121, L.23 - p.122, L.1.)  After
ending the call to dispatch, she testified that she saw one of the silhouettes in the cab of the truck
moving in a manner which she associated with a choking motion, though she admitted she could
not be sure that was actually what was happening or who was doing it. (Tr., p.128, L.17 - p.129,
L.14, p.136, Ls.10-21.)
Officers responded to the neighbor’s call.  The truck was not idling as they approached
and  began  talking  with  Mr.  Hager,  who  was  stepping  down  from  the  driver’s  door  when  they
arrived.   (See Exhibit  2  (video  from  an  officer’s  body  camera).)   As  the  officer  began  talking
with Mr. Hager, J.A. started the truck again before ultimately shutting it off at the officer’s
insistence.  (See Exhibit 2.)
As a result of this incident, the State charged Mr. Hager with attempted strangulation and
domestic battery resulting in traumatic injury.4  (R., pp.60-61.)  Mr. Hager exercised his right to
3 Neither party asked the neighbor whether she remembered that the truck was idling during this
time.  (See generally Tr., pp.119-139.)
4 There  is  no  indication  as  to  whether  J.A.  was  charged  with  DUI.   (See generally R.; see
Tr., p.201, L.16 - p.203, L.13 (one of the officers testifying that he did not investigate the
potential DUI because he was focused on the potential battery).)
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a jury trial and argued a necessity defense – that he had only been acting to prevent J.A. from
driving while intoxicated.
During that trial, the prosecutor asked J.A. to testify about a prior incident when
Mr. Hager had once come to pick her up from a bar and found her being hit on by another bar
patron.  (Tr., p.279, Ls.14-22.)  Defense counsel objected, arguing that such testimony would
introduce improper evidence of prior specific acts.5  (Tr., p.280, Ls.5-18, p.281, Ls.4-5.)  During
a bench conference, the prosecutor explained that J.A.’s intended testimony would be that this
prior incident at the bar irritated Mr. Hager and he would often bring it up during arguments
between them.  (Tr., p.280, L.24 - p.281, L.3.)  The district court overruled Mr. Hager’s
objection, stating:  “There’s no act of violence.  The reason for their fighting is like saying we
fought over money, there’s times she got mad at me.  I think it’s 404(b) kind of stuff, setting the
scene for the relationship stuff.”  (Tr., p.281, Ls.6-11.)  J.A. proceeded to testify consistent with
the prosecutor’s representations.  (Tr., p.281, L.16 - p.282, L.20.)  She also testified that
Mr. Hager had brought up this prior incident again on the day in question (while they were
arguing at the club earlier in the evening).  (Tr., p.294, Ls.22-24.)
The jury ultimately found Mr. Hager guilty as charged.  (R., pp.136-37.)  The district
court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, which was
comprised of a unified sentence fifteen years, with five years fixed, for the attempted
strangulation and a consecutive unified sentence of five years, with zero years fixed, for the
domestic battery.  (R., p.152.)  The district court also retained jurisdiction.  (R., p.152.)
Mr. Hager filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.151, 162.)
5 The record does not contain a notice of intent to introduce evidence of other acts pursuant to
I.R.E. 404(b).  (See generally R.)  However, defense counsel did not object to the introduction of
this evidence on that ground.  (See generally Tr., pp.280-81.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court failed to use the proper standard when it overruled Mr. Hager’s
objection to the admission of improper propensity evidence.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Failed To Use The Proper Standard When It Overruled Mr. Hager’s Objection
To The Admission Of Improper Propensity Evidence
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is subjected to a two-tiered
analysis:  (1) whether that other act (if established as a matter of fact) is relevant to a non-
propensity purpose6; and (2) whether the danger of unfair prejudice from admitting that evidence
would substantially outweigh the probative value of that evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,
52 (2009).  The relevance prong is subject to free review by the appellate courts, while the
prejudice prong is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229
(2008).  When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the appellate court looks to see “(1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) wehther the court acted within
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached is decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
However, there is little to review in respect to either of those two prongs for assessing
character evidence because the district court in this case did not conduct that analysis in ruling on
Mr. Hager’s objection to J.A.’s testimony about those prior incidents and arguments.  (See
generally Tr., p.281, Ls.6-11.)  Instead, it overruled his objection because “[t]here’s no act of
violence”; that evidence was an explanation of the reason for their argument that night; and “it’s
404(b) kind of stuff, setting the scene for the relationship stuff.”  (Tr., p.281, Ls.6-10.)  Since the
district court did not make its decision by using the proper standard, it abused its discretion by
overruling Mr. Hager’s objection admitting the propensity evidence. State v. Marks, 156 Idaho
6 Non-propensity purposes include:  “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  I.R.E. 404(b).
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559, 566 (Ct. App. 2014) (indicating that, while the district court does not need to provide
expansive analysis, it does need to at least identify the non-propensity purpose the evidence is
being introduced to prove in order to comply with the applicable legal standard); see also
Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
That abuse of discretion is further evidenced by the fact that the rationales the district
court actually used do not represent an exercise of reason, since each of those rationales is either
contrary to the plain language of I.R.E. 404(b) or to recent Idaho Supreme Court precedent. See
Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
The district court’s first reason for overruling Mr. Hager’s objection – that “[t]here’s no
act of violence” (Tr., p.281, L.6) – is wholly inconsistent with the plain language of
I.R.E. 404(b).  That rule simply provides:  “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith.”  I.R.E. 404(b).  Nothing in the rule purports to limit its application to only other acts
of violence. Compare State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949, 949 n.1 (Ct. App. 2012)
(explaining that nothing in the rule limits its application to only “bad” acts or only “prior” acts
either).  Therefore, the district court’s first rationale is baseless.
The district court’s second reason for overruling the objection was that the prior incident
at the bar was the reason for the physical fight on the night in question.  (Tr., p.281, Ls.7-8 (“The
reason  for  their  fighting  is  like  saying  we  fought  over  money,  there’s  times  she  got  mad  at
me.”).)  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently held that admitting evidence of other
acts  “to  complete  the  story  of  the  crime  on  trial  by  placing  it  in  context  of  nearby  and  nearly
contemporaneous happenings,” so as to give the jury “a rational and complete presentation of the
alleged crime” is improper. State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, ___, 388 P.3d 583, 587-88 (2017).
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Thus, introducing the evidence of the argument which happened a few hours prior to the charged
conduct so as to give the jurors a more rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime
was improper. Id.  Rather, that evidence would only be admissible if it satisfied the two-tiered
analysis proscribed by I.R.E. 404(b) (which, as will be discussed infra,  it  does  not). See id.
Besides, the district court’s second rationale is wholly inapplicable to the second part of J.A.’s
objected-to testimony: that Mr. Hager would bring up the prior incident at the bar during other
arguments.   (See Tr., p.280, L.5 - p.281, L.5.)  For both those reasons, the second rationale is
also an unreasonable basis for admitting that evidence of prior acts.
The  district  court’s  third  rationale  –  that  J.A.’s  testimony  was  admissible  because  “it’s
404(b) kind of stuff, setting the scene for the relationship stuff” (Tr., p.281, Ls.9-10) – is also
erroneous under the recent decision in Kralovec, since it purports to admit J.A.’s objected-to
testimony just to give the jury the complete story, to “set[] the scene” for the actually-relevant
evidence.  Such evidence is “only admissible if meets the criteria established by the Idaho Rules
of Evidence.” Kralovec, 388 Idaho at 588.  As such, the third rationale is also an unreasonable
basis to admit that evidence of prior acts.
Applying  the  criteria  actually  established  by  the  Idaho  Rules  of  Evidence,  all  of  J.A.’s
objected-to testimony should have been excluded under both prongs of the proper analysis.  First,
that testimony was not relevant to a non-propensity purpose.  In regard to the testimony about
Mr. Hager’s behavior during the prior arguments (the part of J.A.’s objected-to testimony which
the second rationale does not address), the mere similarity between the past and presently-
charged conduct does not make such evidence relevant to non-propensity issues like motive,
plan, or absence of mistake. See, e.g., Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55.  Rather, to be admissible under
I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence embracing the two incidents must be so related to each other that
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proof of past incident tends to prove that the presently-charged conduct. Id. (citing State v.
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425
(1991)).  Without such specifics and similarities, the district court simply, and improperly,
admits evidence which is only probative to the defendant’s propensity to engage in improper
behavior. See id. at 53.  There are no such specifics in J.A.’s testimony about Mr. Hager’s
behavior during their prior arguments.  Therefore, that testimony was not relevant to a non-
propensity purpose.
Similarly, nothing from J.A.’s testimony about what was said during the argument at the
club  earlier  in  the  evening  tends  to  prove  her  account  of  the  fight  in  the  cab  of  her  truck,  or
disprove his. Cf. Marks, 156 Idaho at 566 (indicating the district court at least needs to identify
which non-propensity purpose the evidence is being admitted to prove).  Again, that evidence is
only presented to establish Mr. Hager’s character and his propensity to act consistently
therewith.   Since  none  of  the  objected-to  testimony  was  relevant  to  a  non-propensity  purpose,
Mr. Hager’s objection to that testimony should have been sustained.
And even if that evidence were relevant to a non-propensity purpose, the risk of undue
prejudice from that evidence substantially outweighed that minimal probative value.  The
evidence has a high risk of prejudice because it allows the jurors to conclude that, because he had
been unreasonable about the prior incident at the bar, and had used that incident to provoke or
stoke other arguments, he must have provoked or stoked this argument as well, rather than, as he
testified, tried to stop her driving off in a semi-truck cab while intoxicated.  In fact, J.A.’s
testimony invited the jurors to do precisely that by testifying he had brought up that prior
incident during the argument at the club.  (See Tr., p.294, Ls.22-24.)  That scenario demonstrates
a substantial risk that the jurors would convict him based on a propensity to act consistently with
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a perceived irrationally-jealous character.  That risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighs
the minimal relevance J.A.’s objected-to testimony about those prior arguments might have had.
For that reason also, Mr. Hager’s objection to that testimony should have been sustained.
Since the district court did not use the proper standard to rule on Mr. Hager’s objection to
the propensity evidence, and since, under the proper standard, that evidence should have been
kept out of the trial, that decision should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hager respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
this case for a new trial.
DATED this 7th day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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